Obama’s Task: Reprioritizing U.S. Foreign Policy

While the battered state of the economy in the days winding down to the presidential election determined the fortunes of Senator Barack Obama in his victory over Senator John McCain, it was arguably his pragmatic foreign policy vision that helped him edge out the heavily favored Senator Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary.

As Obama assumes the presidency in January, he will need to tap into that pragmatic foreign policy vision, trading hubris for modesty, by operating with a principle of what grand strategist Barry Posen terms “strategic restraint.” This requires reducing America's costly engagements and overextended forces and resources while prioritizing the challenges that threaten America's national security in the short and medium term. In terms of our rebalancing our engagements, the Obama administration will need to continue the drawdown of forces in Iraq, hold steady in Afghanistan, and refrain from unnecessarily deploying in other parts of the world, particularly the Darfur region of the Sudan.

In Iraq, Obama largely has it right to withdraw combat forces over 16 months given the costs that add up to over 4,000 American lives, a price tag of roughly $3 trillion, and a battered American reputation in the world. Though the surge of 2007 has been touted for security improvements, it has not improved the strategic outlook with a real path for political reconciliation and integration of forces.

Moreover, the sources of the surge's tactical success are quite varied and unclear, including factors external to the U.S. such as the stand down of the Sadr's Mahdi army, the Sunni “awakening” councils' decision to turn on al-Qaeda, and Iran wielding more constructive influence. Nevertheless, this tactical upswing, the growing strength of Iraqi armed forces, and the rising oil-revenue-generated economic prospects all provide an opportunity to declare “victory” and begin to draw down combat troop levels.

In Afghanistan, Obama must not make the mistake of transferring a “surge” strategy and deploying more troops by drawing on the wrong lessons of Iraq. As Lt. Commander Jon Lindsey writes, “Merely surging in Afghanistan in the absence of other violence-reducing factors will probably fail to deliver the desired results. It is much more important to address the hard problems -- mediation of tensions between India and Pakistan, improved coalition and interagency coordination, greater focus on non-kinetic operations -- which are independent of force ratios.”

Moreover, the mission has crept from taking out al-Qaeda and its bases to a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban, a real political actor (whether we like it or not) which commands a fair amount of support in the southern provinces and tribal regions of Pakistan, as well as counter-narcotics operations and a wholesale re-engineering of Afghan society. At some point, scaling back will have to be considered, as efforts to “drain the swamp” have only widened it by taking on more enemies in the tribal frontiers.

As an aside, given Obama's previous statements, stability in Pakistan -- a nuclear power with more than five times the population of Afghanistan and a history of conflict with its nuclear neighbor -- is far more important than Afghanistan. Forcing concessions or cross-border incursions that weaken the Pakistani government's legitimacy or military control of their territory are simply not worth the few targets they yield. Investing in greater cooperation, joint training, and intelligence sharing would provide far greater returns to both countries.

Though both Obama and McCain both pledged greater support of the Darfur region and the issue is very dear to Obama and a number of his national security advisors, it is vital for the Obama administration to refrain from further engagements and not to get bogged down in Darfur. The political, military, financial, and reputational costs to the United States would be too great.

What is happening in Darfur is a crime against humanity, it is not a near or medium threat to the United States, which no longer has the luxury of intervening anywhere for the sake of lofty humanitarian goals given our own entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the looming threats on the horizon to which this current administration has given short shrift.

Moreover, the moral imperatives are much more complex than first sight. Sudan is fighting a brutal counterinsurgency on the cheap against armed rebels, who have refused on more than one occasion to internationally negotiated peace deals, to prevent a precedent of violent regional secession. To intervene on behalf of one side without a full appraisal of the conflict dynamics risks a moral hazard problem of encouraging further rebel resistance and prolonging the conflict.

Finally, the perception of a U.S. occupation of another Muslim Arab country would only compound our troubles in the Middle East and Islamic world, scuttle what is left of our international reputation, and provide a recruitment boon to jihadists. Bolstering the current international mission composed of African Union and United Nations forces with financial, logistical, intelligence assets, and military equipment resources (like helicopters) to ensure a ceasefire would be far better for everyone than sending in the marines.

Meanwhile, the United States needs to begin to refocus on two other pressing issues that have been on the back burner for sometime. First, we need to seriously attend to the problem of nuclear proliferation by ensuring the disablement of North Korea's nuclear reactors and halting Iranian nuclear enrichment (perhaps in exchange for a fuel bank and a small scale enrichment research lab).

The North Korean and Iranian challenges (not to mention Obama's plans for climate change and energy security) cannot be adequately addressed without the support of China and Russia, requiring us to modify our position on relations that have ranged from neglect to outright belligerence over the past eight years. Though it may appear callous at times, strategic prioritization requires steering clear of unnecessary conflicts and entanglements (even in rhetoric) over less critical regions like Georgia, Tibet or Sudan to focus on more pressing issues with wider consequences.

The other major priority is the challenge that lies in the Middle East. Reinvigorating the peace process between Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Syria by resuming America's role as an honest broker can be the game-changing move that stems the tide of instability and creates a virtuous cycle of events throughout the region. Such a move can undercut the animating backdrop of jihadist terrorists, bolster the credibility of moderate states and reform-mind leadership, defang Iran by detaching Syria and Lebanon from them, convene a contact group of regional actors to assist in stabilizing Iraq and the Gulf, and restore American leadership prestige to the region.

America's economic downturn is not a normal business cycle and will require the Obama administration to redirect attention inward to rebuilding the fundamentals of the U.S. economy, which is the bulwark of U.S. power abroad. Consequently, his administration will have to scale back U.S. commitments abroad, prioritize challenges, and focus on the greatest threats to the United States.