You know the financial crisis is bad when investment bankers are
grumpy at Christmastime. That's because in investment banking,
Christmastime is bonus time, and bonus time is what it's all about.
Bonus time is when all the deals you crafted and all the money you made
for the bank gets toted up and you get your fair share.
Usually, in the world of Wall Street and its international
counterparts, that "fair share" can reach 10 or 15 times your annual
salary. That usually makes year-end a time of great joy in investment
banking land.
But this year is different. This is the year when dodgy mortgages,
which had been packaged together, securitized and thus magically
transformed into "ultrasafe" securities, blew up. That led to the
collapse of so many of the deals bankers had crafted (and got paid for)
in past years. Many banks disappeared or were merged out of existence.
Thousands of jobs were lost, and retirement nest eggs, made up largely
of stock received at previous bonus times, dramatically declined in
value -- many to the point of worthlessness.
This year is
different because many CEOs have agreed to forgo bonuses entirely, and
other investment bankers who still have jobs will awaken to find that
coal in a Christmas stocking looks good by comparison.
That's because one of the world's largest financial institutions,
Credit Suisse, just announced that it would pay its bankers up to 80
percent of their 2008 year-end bonuses in the form of what The Wall
Street Journal called "an illiquid group of junk bonds, mortgage-backed
securities and corporate loans" instead of cash or stock, as had been
the norm throughout the industry.
CS effectively told its
bankers that this year, instead of getting paid money, they would get
paid in kind -- the same kind of over-leveraged, securitized paper that
caused much of the crisis in the first place.
This is a fabulous
idea. Not only does it help the bank's balance sheet by moving these
toxic assets off their books and onto those of its employees, but it
serves as an unambiguous reminder to those whose job it is to create
and sell financial products in the markets that this isn't a game of
smoke and mirrors.
Securities actually have to have value, and
those who create and sell them can't just walk away after the wreckage
and claim that it's somebody else's problem. It imposes the discipline
that if you are selling a deal to your clients, you should be willing
to invest in it yourself. Those who created, traded and sold securities
defined by words like "junk" or "toxic" now own them. A lot of them.
Perhaps it will make those who structure products and deals think a
little differently in the future. It's one thing if you think that your
job is just to sell something. It's another if you know you will have
to live with the consequences yourself.
Many bankers at Credit
Suisse are, not surprisingly, livid, the Journal reported. At a time
when they are stretched for cash, bankers -- especially those in
unrelated fields like mergers and acquisitions, equities and research
-- are saying they had nothing to do with creating this problem, so
they shouldn't now have to own them.
But for the past five
years, the majority of banking revenues and profits came from these
structured products, which greatly increased the broad bonus pool --
which is how everyone in the business got paid. When past bonuses
increased by millions year over year, there was nary a peep from those
same bankers who now say the current scheme is unfair.
There's
every reason to believe that the value of these illiquid assets will
increase over time. Some investment bankers have said that the current
standard of "mark-to-market" accounting values these assets only at
whatever people are currently willing to pay for them -- and thus often
at too low a price.
They say that there is far more upside than down for these securities once some sense of normalcy returns to the markets.
But, for investment bankers, it is one thing to argue that to your
clients, regulators and shareholders. It may be quite another when you
have to explain it to your spouse.
I have long advocated a code
of professional responsibility for the investment banking business,
along the lines of what lawyers agree to in return for their license to
practice law. I imagine a code that requires bankers to adopt
principles that impose basic obligations, such as, "I will never sell
something that I would never be willing to own myself."
While I
still believe that we need a code, it appears that the market may have
already moved more quickly than the regulators to achieve the same
goal. At least in the case of Credit Suisse, I think a lot of bankers
will now think twice about deals and products they create and advocate,
if they believe they may end up owning them themselves at the end of
the day.