Congress and the 'YouTube War'

The United States is “fighting a different kind of enemy” in its War on Terror, or so says President Bush. He’s right. For the first time since the days of the Barbary pirates, America is doing active battle not with a rival nation, but with a non-state actor (al Qaeda) that lacks a geographical home, is motivated by ideology more than territorial ambition, and whose victories are defined in non-military terms. It is an enemy that uses communication technology, public opinion, and the global 24-hour news cycle to wage its battles. It is, in a very real sense, the first “YouTube War” of the twenty-first century.

The rise of al Qaeda is a sign of the era in which we live. With the spread of economic and political liberalization, with the advent of new communication technology, and with the gradual erosion of state power and influence, individuals, organizations, and institutions are enjoying an unprecedented opportunity to affect international events. The rise of the non-state actor stands to become the most resonant characteristic of global affairs at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Yet the stateless nature of this different kind of enemy is not being reflected in America’s current anti-terrorism strategy. In fact, the United States is wielding a military approach against its jihadist foes that is straight out of a twentieth-century playbook. President Bush has chosen to wage this “different kind of war” in Iraq, in a manner reminiscent of the Balkan wars, the conflict in Rwanda, and even the Vietnam War -- a territorial, resource-based conflict between rival ethnic and religious groups competing for the spoils of political power.

The New Global Environment

Five years after the attacks of September 11, it is long overdue for the United States to factor this new global environment into its approach for fighting the War on Terror. For five years, Congress has followed the White House’s lead in fighting terrorism, with rather uncertain results. In recent congressional elections, the manner in which America is fighting the War on Terror was rarely debated. But, as the 110th Congress implements a legislative agenda for the next two years, it is of critical importance that it do more than simply articulate the fact that America is fighting a “different kind of war” -- and instead ensure that the United States fight that war differently.

To be sure, broader American success in the War on Terror can only come when the albatross of U.S. involvement in Iraq comes to an end. It has been, and will continue to be, near impossible to wage an effective war against a non-state actor so long as America is mired in a state-based civil war that is weakening its global credibility and diverting its attention and resources. The drawdown of American troops in Iraq would help to refocus America’s antiterrorism agenda on al Qaeda and remove from its jihadist enemies the rallying cry of opposition to the continued occupation. The president’s recent protestations notwithstanding, Iraq is not where the War on Terror will be won or lost. What happens in Iraq will not stop the jihadists from waging their civilizational struggle against the United States.

America is mired in a generation-long battle and what is needed today is a comprehensive antiterror strategy that takes into full account the attributes and characteristics of the enemy that America is facing. In the immediate term, that means re-calibrating the efficacy of military power in a war against non-state actors, focusing on the tools of public perception to win the war of ideas, and above all, utilizing the capabilities, knowledge, and resources of constructive non-state actors on behalf of U.S. foreign policy goals.

The Trap Called Iraq

There is probably no more venerated -- and well-funded -- public institution in American society than the U.S. military. Few in Congress have openly questioned the effectiveness of the military as a tool for fighting terrorism. But America’s military has significant limitations when it comes to defeating a non-state actor enemy such as al Qaeda. In the wake of September 11, the Bush administration (understandably) made military power the tip of the sword in America’s response and the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan remains the most effective tactic that has been employed against al Qaeda: removing the terrorists’ home base, dispersing their leaders, and severely degrading the group’s ability to wage attacks against America.

The war in Iraq, on the other hand, has tragically laid bare the limitations of using military force when fighting a non-state actor. Prior to September 11, Osama bin Laden and his top cohorts expressed a willingness, even desire, for the United States to invade and occupy a Muslim country. They saw the benefits of a long, protracted struggle between the United States and an Islamic enemy -- and they have reaped great rewards from the U.S. war in Iraq. Instead of focusing U.S. political, military, and economic power on fighting terrorism, preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a base of operations for al Qaeda, and organizing an antiterror coalition of like-minded nations, Washington has mired the nation in an internecine, sectarian conflict. Above all, the war in Iraq has shown the limitations of U.S. political will and military might. No longer is America perceived as the invincible, benevolent power that it was before it invaded Iraq. As a result, America’s deterrent power has been significantly and fundamentally eroded. It may be the ultimate irony of America’s post-9/11 warrior ethic that the law enforcement officials who prevented the bombing of trans-Atlantic flights to the United States last summer have done as much or more to directly protect the American people than the troops who have rotated through Iraq. This, of course, is not to impugn the soldiers who are fighting and dying in Iraq, but instead the leaders who sent them there. During the 2004 presidential campaign, Senator John Kerry was excoriated by the Bush camp for intimating that the War on Terror could be treated as a law enforcement matter. When one considers how easily the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented by effective coordination among America’s law enforcement agencies, one can’t help but wonder whether the senator was on to something. The reality is that, in an era of asymmetric threats and non-state actors, the sledgehammer of American military force is not necessarily the best means of protecting America’s interests -- sometimes, it’s just old-fashioned police work.

Winning the War of Ideas

In April 2003, it seemed for a moment that the dominant image of the Iraq war would be the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad’s Republic Square. Instead, it is likely to be the pathetic, hooded, and tortured Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison, the Internet videos of Iraqi insurgents attacking American troops, or a defiant Saddam at the gallows.

In the era of the non-state actor, public perception is crucial, but soldiers don’t do public relations. They fight wars and they kill their enemies -- and few have been more effective at this essential skill than the U.S. military. But few armies have been more unprepared for the public relations element of twenty-first century conflict. As Thomas Ricks’ recent book, Fiasco, makes clear, the U.S. military is unsuited for fighting counter-insurgencies. The rampant disclosures of abuse, which culminated in the Abu Ghraib scandal, were largely the result of sending well-trained military units into a guerrilla conflict in a strange land, where years of military training provided little preparation for the daily challenge of armed occupation. The result was a precipitous decline in America’s standing around the world, even among its allies. Recent polling data shows that strong majorities in Germany (78 percent) and Great Britain (56 percent) agreed that the United States was doing a “bad job” of promoting human rights. In a similar poll taken in 1998, fewer than one in four Germans (24 percent) and Britons (22 percent) held that view. ¹

The importance of public perceptions was not lost on America’s enemy. As former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) deputy director John E. McLaughlin has noted, al Qaeda today is driven primarily by “ideology and the Internet.” Right now, the morbidly curious can log onto YouTube.com and other viral video sites that popularize free content through the Internet or any number of jihadist websites to see videos of the killing of American soldiers and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks against coalition troops. As disturbing as these images are, they provide graphic evidence of al Qaeda’s success in using Iraq to create a prime recruiting tool for the terrorists of tomorrow. As a recent memo by the director of strategic communications at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad points out, “Insurgents, sectarian elements, and others are taking control of the message at the public level.”

Congress and the 'YouTube War'

The level of sophistication from insurgent forces is extraordinary, attacks on U.S. forces are filmed from multiple angles with high-resolution optics. Footage is actually edited and soundtracks feature religious statements. According to a recent Newsweek article, “U.S. officials believe insurgents attack American forces primarily to generate fresh footage.” This contrasts greatly with the normal U.S. response to military actions taken in Iraq -- a press release.

However, the White House continues to blame public relations failures for undermining U.S. effectiveness in the War on Terror. In a Los Angeles Times op-ed in early 2006, former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld bragged about the new “strategic communications framework” put forward by the Pentagon to get out America’s story. This past October, word leaked that the Pentagon plans to ramp up its communications effort by creating a rapid response media unit. But even the best communications plan is mere window dressing if you don’t have a good story to tell. A November 2006 Atlantic Monthly profile of Karen Hughes was illuminating in this regard.

The top U.S. public diplomat noted how hard it was for her to “sell” America in the Arab world because of the conflict in Iraq. Iraq notwithstanding, recalibrating the public perception of U.S. foreign policy must be front and center in the minds of the new Congress. It is a great irony of the War on Terror that, while sizable percentages of Muslims are rejecting violence and, in particular, suicide bombings, this has not translated into a more positive view of the United States and its foreign policy objectives. In the five most predominately Muslim countries, sizable majorities continue to express markedly negative views of America and, in particular, the War on Terror.

Yet Washington’s public diplomacy efforts have sputtered. Since 2003, the State Department has been justly faulted for its lack of an overall strategy, qualified staff, and culturally sophisticated approach to public diplomacy -- and for not utilizing the lessons of private-sector campaigns more effectively. Reinvigorating the effort will require not only presidential involvement, but also genuine public measures to improve America’s image overseas.

These can run the gamut from small but meaningful initiatives such as the opening (rather than the closing) of American libraries in foreign locales, increased student exchange programs, foreign scholarships, and wide-ranging public health initiatives to the more vigorous engagement of American business, nonprofits, and even public relations firms in changing perceptions of the United States around the world. When fighting an enemy as media savvy as al Qaeda, Washington needs to take far more seriously the crucial importance of public perception in the YouTube era.

Utilizing Non-State Actors

The universal recognition of organizations like al Qaeda is a clear example of the success of non-state actors in placing themselves on the world’s radar screens. But just as terrorist groups have been able to project themselves, so too have individuals, organizations, and corporations shown the ways in which altruistically minded non-state actors can change the world for the better. In an era of growing privatization in foreign affairs, the United States needs to do more to use these influential non-state actors to further foreign policy objectives.

Take the example of Rita Katz, a freelance intelligence gatherer, whose company, the Search for International Terrorist Entities Institute (SITE), provides some of the most up-to-date intelligence about terrorist organizations. Katz and others in the freelance intelligence field have been extraordinarily effective at ferreting out time-sensitive and actionable intelligence resources. At a time when only several dozen people in the FBI have proficiency in Arabic, policymakers should look more closely at individuals like Katz for clues that will uncover a terrorist attack before it occurs. Moreover, groups like SITE or the Investigative Project, headed by Steve Emerson, have shown an ability to harvest public sources of information in areas that traditional intelligence-gatherers eschew.

As Emerson notes, America’s intelligence agencies are hindered by a bureaucratic culture that is overly compartmentalized, resists information-sharing, and has an innate distrust of open source information, which is why outside groups “can do a lot more.” But private intelligence is but one piece of the puzzle. There are numerous other examples of non-state actors furthering national security by drawing on the work of political consultants who advise opposition movements in former Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Ukraine; of trial lawyers who seek to hold state sponsors of terrorists legally responsible; and military contractors who train modern armed forces.

The Bush administration has used some of these groups in isolated circumstances, but the practice of actively drawing on the know-how of non-state actors should become a fundamental element of foreign policy. With Congress’ urging, government agencies should be creating departmental liaisons specifically geared toward reaching non-state actors and utilizing their discrete expertise.

Regulating Military Contractors

Above all, Congress must draft commonsense guidelines for non-state actors to develop relationships that are based on transparency, accountability, and oversight. Consider the case of military contractors. In Bosnia, these groups provided essential security support for U.S. peacekeeping troops. In Afghanistan, private military contractors (PMCs) helped U.S. forces attack al Qaeda leaders and recruit proxy Afghan armies. In Iraq, PMCs are the backbone of the U.S. occupation, providing essential administrative and security services. According to recent Pentagon estimates, there are currently 25,000 private security contractors (PSCs) engaged in Iraq. This private army of contractors represents the second-largest contingent of armed personnel serving in Iraq who provide essential support to America’s overburdened military. Since April 2003, the Labor Department estimates that more than 670 contractors have been killed -- a total greater than all non-U.S. coalition fatalities combined.

Yet few are asking the difficult questions about their responsibilities. Many firms operate in a gray zone beyond congressional oversight, military codes of conduct, and even international law. For example, in the United States, only recently have legislative changes made it possible for PSCs to be held accountable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the legal code that applies to U.S. military personnel. This attempt at enhancing accountability on the battlefield is a step in the right direction, though it remains to be seen if it is actually implementable. While certain international conventions apply to armed civilians, enforcement of these rules is discretionary and has been generally non-existent. In Iraq, if a contractor kills an Iraqi civilian, there is virtually no legal recourse for the victim’s family. The involvement of civilian contractors in military roles also creates operational challenges. Private security contractors are outside the official chain of command and control. But, to the average Iraqi citizen, the actions of contractors are indistinguishable from those of soldiers. They are just more Americans carrying guns -- uniform or no uniform. As a result, illegal actions by PSCs reflect directly -- often negatively -- on their home country.

Clearly, America’s reliance on PSCs is growing faster than Washington’s ability or inclination to regulate them. Congressional action is long overdue.

Supporting Those 'Supporting Democracy'

In addition, Congress and the Bush administration need to do a better job of standing up for individuals and organizations that work to promote democracy overseas. For more than a decade, foreign funds, not only from sympathetic foreign governments, but from a number of non-state actors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and wealthy individuals, have flowed freely into nascent democracies. This seed capital has paid for political expertise, civic organizing, and public relations programs that have helped propel democratic movements.

But in January 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed legislation oppressively regulating non-governmental organizations in Russia. The bill created a government agency with a mandate to monitor more than 400,000 civil society groups now in existence and shut down those whose activities “contradict the constitution or the laws of the Russian Federation.” This effort was widely perceived as a direct attack on a fledgling Russian democracy.

Yet while the Bush administration protested, the complaints were half-hearted and lacking true diplomatic muscle. Restricting the work of NGOs is a shot across the bow to the administration’s stated policy of encouraging the spread of democracy. Moreover, when U.S. international credibility is in decline, NGOs and advocacy groups can play a unique role in circumventing diplomatic channels and promoting objectives fundamental to national interests. But they need diplomatic support. The success of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts at stifling democracy advocates may encourage emulation otherwise. Congress should take up the issue of NGOs operating freely in Russia today as it did the issue of Jewish refuseniks in the past.

Engaging the Business Community

Last November, a G-8 sponsored conference of global business leaders debated how they might help in the fight against terrorism. The results were achievable ideas for cross-border collaboration: improved monitoring of terrorist activity in the financial, telecommunications, and Internet sectors, and agreement to prioritize sectors that were potential targets of a terrorist attack, such as infrastructure, international trade supply chains, and centers of tourism. Heads of international transport unions, banks, agricultural and industry conglomerates, and even the World Diamond Council offered models of how new standards and information-sharing could help to expose havens of criminal activity. Above all, business leaders acknowledged that thus far their efforts have been reactive -- protecting employees and assets -- but precious little effort has been put toward proactively countering terrorist operations.

Initiatives to harness the resources and innovation of the private sector are encouraging. Collaboration between business and government to fight terrorism can be especially effective when implemented at the local and regional level. But this is no easy task. Government officials are often unable to speak the language of non-state actors and the communication gap has frustrated a number of well-intentioned proposals. Congress must ultimately ensure that the engagement of the private sector is abetted with incentives and leadership, so that segmented actions become a sum greater than their parts.

Congress, in short, has an opportunity to change the course of the War on Terror and ensure that America is fighting this “different kind of enemy” in a different and effective manner. To do so, Washington must recognize the changing nature of global relations, which offers greater opportunities for non-state actors, but also demands of them greater responsibilities. Doing so is a complicated endeavor, but it must become a defining feature of U.S. foreign policy. To successfully wage the War on Terror requires more than tough talk and the sword of military tactics -- it requires a fundamental rethinking of the forces driving global affairs in the twenty-first century.

¹.“American and International Opinion on the Rights of Terrorism Suspects,” Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, July 17, 2006, at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/