The recent problems of the steel industry in dealing
with dramatic surges of imports from a number of countries put
import relief back on the U.S. policy agenda. Whatever one's
views on the merits of trade, it is beyond dispute that imports
will occasionally bring about dramatic dislocations in the form
of factory closings and layoffs. As U.S. industries ranging
from textiles to steel to semiconductors will attest, no country,
including the United States, is immune from this reality of
globalization.
Unfortunately, U.S. policy for responding to economic disruptions
caused by imports is sadly out of date. Temporary import relief
is provided under a law known as Section 201, which is based
upon the simple premise that temporary relief from imports may
be provided in order to give import competing U.S. industries
the breathing space needed to undertake reforms to become more
competitive.
In the 1970s through the mid-1980s, Section 201 was frequently
used. A number of U.S. companies and industries, including the
Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Company, were able to use the respite
from imports provided under Section 201 to return to competitive
health. In recent years, however, owing to weaknesses in the
law and reluctance on the part of policymakers to use it, Section
201 has fallen into disuse.
This is an outcome that both "protectionists" and "free traders"
should seek to reverse. Section 201 provides an opportunity
to provide temporary import relief in a manner consistent with
U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) while
promoting competitive adjustment. It is also infinitely superior
to the inevitable alternative -- ad hoc legislative efforts to
limit imports, which will likely violate the WTO, spark clashes
with trading partners, and fail to effectively encourage adjustment.
As the recent demonstrations in Seattle made clear, the political
reality is that the American public is not willing to tolerate
unfettered free trade. Section 201 strikes a balance that allows
trade liberalization to proceed while addressing the legitimate
concerns of industries facing import competition. Those in the
government and private sector seriously interested in continuing
on the path to trade liberalization would do well to place revitalizing
Section 201 high on their agenda.
RELIEF UNDER SECTION 201
Under the WTO, any member is allowed to impose temporary escape
clause or safeguard relief from imports for up to eight years,
provided those imports are causing serious injury to the competing
domestic industry. In the United States, this escape clause
is operationalized through Section 201. The statute is administered
through a two-step process. After action is initiated under
Section 201 -- normally in response to a petition from a domestic
industry -- the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) decides
if the WTO and statutory requirements for serious injury are
met and, if so, makes recommendations for relief.
The proceeding then moves to the White House, where the President
makes the final decision on whether and in what form relief
will be extended. The President has wide latitude to weigh a
range of factors in making his decision. Although action can
be expedited, the entire process normally takes up to 9 months;
on paper, this makes Section 201 a relatively fast route to
import relief
The modern Section 201 was created in the Trade Act of 1974.
Several important provisions, such as an eight-year time limit
on relief and an emphasis upon adjustment plans, date to the
Trade Act of 1988.
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO SAFEGUARD ACTION
Despite these changes to the law, there are a number of problems
with Section 201 that have caused it to fall out of use in recent
years. Perhaps the most significant of these involve differences
between U.S. law and the WTO that make Section 201 more difficult
to employ than need be the case.
One key difference has to do with the interpretation of what
constitutes serious injury to an industry. The so-called "serious
injury test" is the threshold test that must be satisfied under
the WTO; specifically, it requires the demonstration of serious
injury or threat thereof before import limitations can be imposed.
The WTO does offer some vague guidance regarding the components
of a serious injury determination. These include stating that
it must be accompanied by an absolute or relative increase in
imports, requiring that it constitute "