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Sameer Lalwani: All Related Content

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Selective Leviathans: Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation | Précis

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
July 30, 2014 |
IN THE SECOND HALF of the twentieth century, civil wars eclipsed inter–state war as the "far greater scourge" in terms of death toll, duration, and occurrence and with it, a host of new conflict puzzles emerged. One puzzling feature is that many states seem to defy normative, political, or strategic incentives and choose costly, heavy–handed, counterinsurgency methods, producing high levels of violence and civilian casualties.

Countering Others' Insurgencies | RAND

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
July 30, 2014 |
This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed.

The state is not serious about Naxalism | The Hindu Business Line

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
July 16, 2014 |
Naxals, unlike other insurgents, are not seen to threaten economically and strategically important regions.

Understanding India’s Counterinsurgency Strategy Against the Naxal Threat | India in Transition

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
July 14, 2014 |
On the campaign trail, Chief Minister Narendra Modi touted muscular rhetoric and a “zero tolerance” policy towards Naxalism, but those expecting Prime Minister Modi’s government to overhaul the existing strategy – his plan to tinker at the margins notwithstanding – should not hold their breath. The Naxal insurgency was described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as India’s “single biggest internal-security challenge” and estimated to affect one-third of India’s districts.

India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation

Since its independence in 1947, India has fought dozens of campaigns against four distinct and independent insurgencies on its soil—in Punjab, Kashmir, the Northeast, and the Maoist insurgents of central India—as well as one foreign campaign in Sri Lanka.

Whither Command of the Commons?

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
  • and Joshua Shifrinson, International Security Program Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
September 13, 2011

Introduction: Command of the Commons and U.S. Primacy

In 1805, British Admiral Horatio Nelson defeated a combined Franco-Spanish fleet off the coast of Spain that threatened to deny Britain command of the sea around Western Europe. Nelson’s success ensured that the United Kingdom retained what analysts would today refer to as “command of the commons”—the ability to project military power and engage in trade at times and places of its choosing while denying the same privileges to others.

U.S. Warns Pakistan to 'Do More' | Al Jazeera

May 15, 2010

... The US, meanwhile, has already accelerated its aerial bombing campaign in the tribal regions: Suspected drone strikes have already occurred 35 times this year, compared with 53 attacks in all of 2009, according to the Washington-based New America Foundation, which maintains a comprehensive databaseof the strikes. ...

"I don't see what more boots on the ground will do ... in terms of bolstering the military's capacity to fight the TTP," said Sameer Lalwani, a research fellow at the New America Foundation.

Pakistan's COIN Flip

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
April 19, 2010

Though Pakistan has not completely adopted the models, tactics, and best practices of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine advocated by Western strategists, there is considerable evidence of movement in recent years toward a hybrid approach. Security forces have historically employed a variety of tactics including raids, “coercive sorting,” and sometimes population security, but they experienced repeated failures from 2001 to 2008. Though results of the more recent approach seem promising, prospects for long-term success remain unclear.

Strategic Rethink Needed

  • By
  • Sameer Lalwani,
  • New America Foundation
March 14, 2010 |

For years, the United States has miscalculated Pakistani strategic interests in Afghanistan, which continues to involve tactical and operational support for some sections of the Taliban.

It is now becoming clearer how Pakistani interests are driven not only by ‘strategic depth’ — military doctrine oriented towards India — but also by concerns of regional encirclement and hedging against expected western withdrawal.

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