Iraq

From Our Foreign Bureaus: Iraq Referendum, Independent-Minded Greenland

Joe Mathews — Sun, 30 Nov 2008 19:32:00 -0500

IRAQI REFERENDUM: The 2009 referendum most important to Americans may take place in Iraq. Sunni parties won a commitment for a public referendum by July 30, 2009 on the new security agreement between the U.S. and the Baghdad government. That agreement calls for full American withdrawal by the end of 2011. A vote by the Iraqi people to reject the agreement could lead to an even earlier withdrawal by the U.S.

POLL: UKRAINIANS WANT VOTE ON NATO MEMBERSHIP: Some 80 percent support a vote on whether to join NATO. The poll is less clear on what Ukrainians would do if they had such a vote.

GREENLAND INDEPENDENCE: The world's biggest island votes for more independence from Denmark.

BULLYING THE IRISH: It looks like the Irish, who turned down the European Union's Lisbon Treaty, are going to be forced to vote again.

ASP In the News | August 1-4

Ian McAllister — Mon, 04 Aug 2008 14:34:00 -0400

iStockAnalyst (08/01) features Steve Clemons discussing Obama's need for a degree of moral flexibility.
Washington Independent (07/30) quotes Peter Bergen on the need for more troops in Afghanistan.
Foreign Policy (07/30) cites Daniel Levy on potential candidates to lead Kadima after Olmert's resignation.
The Window (07/19) talks with Parag Khanna on the U.S.' relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government.

ASP In the News | July 16-18

Ian McAllister — Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:33:00 -0400

The Economist (07/17) quotes Peter Bergen on Al Qaeda's self destructive tendencies.
iStock Analyst (07/17) features Steve Clemons arguing against claims of success in Iraq.
The New York Observer (07/17) reviews Michael Cohen's new book, Live from the Campaign Trail.
The Moderate Voice (07/16) cites Daniel Levy on evolving aspects of the Israeli Palestinian divide.
The Newshour with Jim Lehrer (07/16) interviews Daniel Levy on Israel's controversial trade with Hamas.
Financial Times (07/16) quotes Steve Clemons on the Cheney's loss of influence in the Bush Administration.
Policy Innovations (07/14) features Flynt Leverett discussing the rise of China on global business and security.
Freezer Box (07/11) cites Jeffrey Lewis on the growing role for civil society in nuclear nonproliferation.

SOFA's Unintended Consequences

Kailash Srinivasan — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 23:26:00 -0400

Might the Bush administration's secretive quest to complete the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) in Iraq trigger political reconciliation? In a roundabout way, the administration's strategic myopia in pursuing the SOFA has created a political rethink in Iraq that might just create a sustainable framework for national accommodation.

That's because the ill-conceived SOFA/SFA has been met with fierce opposition by a number of Iraqi political groups. In a recent Boston Globe article, New America's Daniel Le vy argues this might not be such a bad thing. The unintended consequence of America's over-reach is a new Iraqi nationalist consensus that has brought Sunni, Shi'ite, and secular Iraqi parties together.

This nascent coalition could be the key to building a sustainable political culture, preserving the country's territorial integrity, and curbing excessive Iranian interference. At a minimum, it would stem the excesses of an American regional strategy built around a heavy and sustained military presence.

Digging Deeper On Iraq

Patrick Doherty — Mon, 14 Jul 2008 15:49:00 -0400

I'm still looking for what is new and more sophisticated about Barack Obama's New York Times opinion article, My Plan For Iraq. Maybe the answer is that there is little new here, except for the news hook provided by the Maliki government.

Steve Clemons has a good overall assessment of the article at The Washington Note. I'm going to focus on a few items I think are essential that I want Senator Obama to address.

The overall problem I see with this statement of Iraq policy is that it is too focused on the troop issue, not enough on the twisted politics of the Persian Gulf. Clausewitz is still right: war is the extension of politics by other means. In order to really get the troops out of Iraq, the next president will have to fundamentally change the politics of Iraq and of the region. I just do not see Senator Obama really willing to go there, publicly. That is why his plan requires such a potentially large follow-on force.

Here's what I mean. Changing the politics of Iraq means getting a real process underway that can build a legitimate and durable political consensus in Iraq. This is not new or unknown. It is merely what was called for in the Iraq Study Group report. To get all the stakeholders to the table, however, will take a commitment from the U.S. and the international community to admit that the current government of Nuri al-Maliki is less than legitimate. This is 180 degrees from the Bush and McCain strategies for Iraq and even Obama is recognizing the Maliki government's sovereignty in today's piece in the Times. I, however, believe that government is part of the problem that we have created.

In short, we need a political surge to complement the military surge. It may not be led by the United States, as Carlos Pascual at Brookings has argued, but it must be supported by the United States. And if the Maliki government becomes just one of the political factions at the table, then we will need more than just troop withdrawal as leverage. Steve Clemons, writing this morning, called for a Bonn Conference, of the sort Amb. Dobbins put together for Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. That would work fine. I just don't see troop withdrawal alone getting the Maliki government to the table.

The reason is that they will have little incentive. If, as Senator Obama states, the Maliki government will be able to "provide security" by 2010, then by the time of inauguration day, it will likely have a force advantage over the competing militias, at least the non-Kurdish ones. Could it not be just as likely that the Maliki government will simply roll the dice, cast its lot with Shi'ite militias, and finish the ethnic cleansing of the oil-rich south of Iraq? Then, political accommodation will be much easier, and more lucrative.

Oil has another role to play. In addition to limiting the sovereignty of the Maliki government (which can be done under the UN's Responsibility to Protect provisions) any effort, by the U.S. or under a UN flag, will have compell the ruling Kurds and Shi'ite factions by imposing a new Iraqi oil embargo on the northern and southern fields. Oil, of course, is the real prize for the parties in Iraq and the denial of it will really hurt the oil revenue patronage that distorts Iraqi politics. It's a hardball move, but why should we be ok with our soldiers dying when we're not willing to use all the non-lethal leverage at hand?

Getting the regional politics right means getting Iran to play ball on Iraq. That would be a major reversal of the Bush policy and would recognize Iraq as the greater, more immediate strategic problem. However, Senator Obama recently said that Iran is the "greatest strategic threat in the region in a generation." I'm not so sure. While I am certain Senator Obama was speaking of threats from states and non-states, I think our current policy in Iraq is the biggest, most destabilizing threat. The next president will have to make a choice.

Because of that, I would engage Iran in conversations around a grand bargain, as my colleague Flynt Leverett has argued. Part of that bargain would be Iraq, part nuclear power, part political recognition, part ending support for regional destabilization either directly or indirectly through proxies like Hezbollah.

But to even dream of such internal and regional political moves we would need a committment from the new White House to reduce oil consumption dramatically over the next 25 years. A new oil embargo would take 2 million bpd off the global oil markets, threatening our own economy further and at the same time, Iran needs to know we are ending the massive redistribution of U.S. wealth to oil producers. Obama's 35% reduction is not enough. We can do 100% and the plan exists. That, like Obama advisor Sarah Sewall has said, would give us incredible strategic latitude to get deal with this complex region without being dependent on them at the same time.

Troop withdrawal is just not the panacea Democrats want. I'm sorry it is not so simple. To really get a viable outcome in the region, we have to change American interests around oil, we have to transform the regional politics, and we have to get the parties to the table in Baghdad. That's the only way a negotiated, durable political agreement will emerge. I think that is called "changing the mindset."

Seattle Voters to Divest From Israel?

Joe Mathews — Sat, 24 May 2008 17:10:00 -0400

The Forward reports on plans for a municipal ballot initiative in Seattle that would require city pension funds to divest from companies that do business in Israel or profit from the Iraq war. The specific investments being targeted involve Halliburton (the military contractor doing big business in Iraq) and Caterpillar (which sells a lot of bulldozers in Israel). Whatever your views on Israel and Iraq, this initiative should concern you. Do voters really want to use their city to make foreign policy statements? (Yes, San Francisco, you can put your hand down now). You may like the foreign policy now, but you may not like the future foreign policy. And cities have enough to worry about in setting local policy. Second, and more significant, turning pension funds into instruments of policy is a high-risk idea with potentially disastrous consequences for taxpayers. American cities have such a problem with unfunded pension liabilities that such funds would do well to focus exclusively on maximizing returns.

ASP In the News | May 12-14

Ian McAllister — Wed, 14 May 2008 16:33:00 -0400

The Associated Press (05/ 13) quotes Daniel Levy on the state of the Middle East peace process.
Foreign Policy in Focus (05/12) cites William Hartung on lessons learned in the Iraq War.
The New York Observer (05/12) mentions Parag Khanna in a discussion of the state of US hegemony.
World Politics Review (05/12) cites Flynt Leverett on China-US tensions.
US News (05/09) quotes Steve Clemons on Hillary Clinton's fading political future.

American Strategy In the News | April 10-11

Ian McAllister — Fri, 11 Apr 2008 19:52:00 -0400

US News & World Report (04/11) asks Sherle Schwenninger about economic policy and the U.S. government.
The National Interest (04/10) quotes Steve Clemons on the subtlety of realist politics.
Bloomberg (03/24) quotes William Hartung on the benefits to contractors in Iraq.

Bush's War

Patrick Doherty — Tue, 25 Mar 2008 18:05:00 -0400

Tonight, Frontline airs Part II of Bush's War on PBS. With interviews from our own Steve Coll and Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, the show promises the most in-depth look at the decisions that brought us to the five year anniversary of the invasion. Click on the image below to view Part I, available online now.

The Next President and the Middle East

Patrick Doherty — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 16:04:00 -0400

The greater Middle East contains only six percent of the world's population but can keep the United States distracted from the bigger strategic issues: making globalization, the rise of Asia, and the American economy stable and sustainable, for instance. Writing in the American Prospect, Daniel Levy lays out a regional to-do list for the next president of the United States.

By Daniel Levy, New America Foundation

The American Prospect | April 2008

Listen carefully when a new president is inaugurated next January for the sigh of relief coming from most of those Middle Easterners whom President Bush embraced as allies. Conversely, Bush’s rivals in the region are likely to tune in to the occasion in a disgruntled mood. For them the Bush years have been good for business. The menu of grievances on which they’ve fed has become a veritable feast. Opposition to American designs in the region -- deployed with different emphases and with different goals by al-Qaeda, Iran, Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah, to name but a few -- has been an easy sell and has won countless new adherents.

To be a friend of “Bush the Younger” in Arabia has not been such a comfortable disposition. Even the Israelis have begun to recognize the limited utility of a president, despite all his words of support, who is so vilified abroad and divisive at home that coalition-building and agenda-advancement are beyond him.

A new president can expect to be greeted by an initial spike in America’s standing in public opinion polls both globally and in the Middle East. This phenomenon will likely be magnified if a Democrat is in the White House and further embellished if that Democrat is Barack Obama. There will be a honeymoon period of openness, of a willingness to suspend judgment and to look again at America and what it stands for.

But the next administration will inherit a regional mess that will require more than some presidential goodwill and an image makeover. The president’s Middle East inbox will include Iraq, Iran, al-Qaeda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and much more. Set alongside this, even health-care reform may take on the appearance of low-hanging fruit.

The temptation will be to focus on improving the mechanics of making and implementing decisions and treating each problem separately, with various regional issues being compartmentalized. Some cosmetic changes might also be thrown in. One could envisage, for instance, the appointment of a special envoy to oversee an Iraq international support group and another for the Middle East peace process. That first appointment would be new; the latter has not existed for the past eight years, and its reintroduction would signal serious intent. A new American ambassador could be appointed to Damascus, symbolizing reengagement in dialogue with adversaries. The last ambassador, Margaret Scobey, was recalled from Syria on Feb. 15, 2005, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon.

Such moves should be welcomed and might even be helpful, but capacity and cosmetics are just the beginning. As Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt, concludes in a recent article, “better a policy without an envoy than an envoy without a policy.”

Policies will have to change. But so too will the framework of understanding from which those policies are derived. Take, as an example, the Israeli-Palestinian Annapolis peace process, launched in November 2007. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice managed to lead a change in policy within the administration and to renew efforts toward a permanent-status peace deal after a seven-year hiatus. She probably deserves credit for even getting this far, but the Annapolis process was straitjacketed from the start by its framing. Even when a breakthrough document on Israeli-Palestinian peace has become a priority, the kinds of policy initiatives that could lead to this goal were rejected at the outset for ideological reasons. Just before the Annapolis gathering, 66 former U.S. senior officials and experts, spearheaded by Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Lee Hamilton, sent a letter to the president and secretary of state welcoming the new effort and counseling that an “inclusive” process that would involve (even indirectly) and incentivize actors such as Syria and Hamas would be much more likely to succeed than one that excluded them. (In the interest of full disclosure, the New America Foundation -- my employer -- and I were involved in organizing and promoting this letter.) That counsel was not heeded. Syria was indeed invited but not engaged. The policy -- no peace effort -- was changed, but the framing -- Israel/Palestine is part of the war on terror, so one must isolate Islamists, Iran, and their ilk -- remained the same. The Annapolis exercise was thereby handicapped from the start.

Similarly on Iraq, Rice moved to engage with all the neighboring nations in February 2007, but within a mandate so narrow that it severely limited the regional push for a settlement in Iraq. At the micro-level, the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq (and Afghanistan) successfully demanded that they be authorized to work with a broad cross section of local actors, including those with problematic histories and Islamist credentials. Likewise, the increasing reliance of U.S. forces on local Sunni Awakening Councils was a new direction. However, none of this led to a reframing of the narrative at the meta-level. The U.S. view on whom to bring into the Iraqi political dialogue -- from both inside and outside the country -- remained prohibitively blinkered. As a result, political progress remains painfully elusive.

Iraq’s more troublesome neighbors, some U.S. allies, some not (Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the former camp, Iran and Syria in the latter), cannot wave a wand and magically end the Mesopotamia mess. They can be instrumental, though, in helping to stabilize the situation. That requires incentives, constant prodding, and a comprehensive rethink from the U.S.

Accordingly, a new administration Middle Eastern “to do” list that amounts just to isolating the issues, managing the processes efficiently, keeping ambitions modest, and throwing everything at Iraq, would be wholly inadequate to the task ahead. The first priority should be to connect the dots of regional issues to reflect the realities and interdependencies on the ground. One cannot solve anything in the Middle East (including Iraq) without looking afresh and trying to solve just about everything.

Change must begin at the Department of Deep Narrative Framing (DDNF). Absent a new narrative for the Middle East, a Democratic administration will inexorably, even unintentionally, slide into the grip of the liberal hawks. The equation will look something like this: unreconstructed narrative + good liberal interventionist inclinations = a more competent (perhaps) but equally misguided (and perhaps therefore even more dangerous) version of neoconservatism, albeit wrapped in a more palatable sales pitch. If the Democrats seize the reins of government next January, they should not forget to grab control of the DDNF. Barack Obama’s claim that he would not only “end the war in Iraq” but also “end the mind-set that got us into that war” indicates that one candidate at least is eyeing up the DDNF for change. What might a reshuffle at the department produce?

Start by redrawing that map of issue interconnectivity, retiring the current war on terror paradigm, and rethinking the appeal to hearts and minds. Cranking up the use of soft power and aid programs and reducing the military footprint is not enough. At least three epiphanies are required of the next president to go forward: First, recognize that certain widely held grievances in the Middle East -- the Palestinians’ most particularly -- are both legitimate and solvable. Second, understand that political Islamists are not all the same, are not all al-Qaeda, and that building a policy based on these differences is crucial to resolving the region’s problems. And third, comprehend that regional stability demands inclusivity and a commitment to multilateralism.

The global war on terror and the democratization narratives that the Bush administration has propagated are irredeemably discredited in the Middle East. They are most commonly seen as a war on Islam and a hypocritical and inconsistent application of a “freedom” agenda that protects autocratic friends and punishes democratic opponents.

A recent sporting episode demonstrates the global resonance of a grievance largely ignored in the U.S. The Africa Nations Cup, a continent-wide biannual soccer tournament (a mini World Cup) was hosted in Ghana this January and February. Egypt emerged victorious, guaranteeing massive interest not only throughout Africa but also across the Middle East on the Arabic satellite channels. The matches coincided with the Gaza siege and Rafah border breakout, and on scoring the tournament’s winning goal, Egypt’s star striker, Mohamed Aboutrika, lifted his national team jersey to reveal a T-shirt bearing the inscription, in English and Arabic, “Sympathize with Gaza.” America’s media was totally oblivious to these goings-on, but for vast areas of our world this simple gesture of solidarity echoed louder than a dozen presidential speeches about why the Palestinians must first recognize their Israeli occupiers and reject the Hamas party that they voted for in free elections.

Travel almost anywhere in the Arab or Muslim world and you will hear the same refrain, including from America’s most ardent friends in the business community and civil society: “Why do you allow or even encourage such things to happen to the Palestinian people? How can we stand with you on this?”

Most Middle Easterners who have no sympathy with al-Qaeda and extremism do nonetheless identify with the Palestinians’ grievances. The sense of U.S. indifference to such grievances and unwillingness to address them is a source of great sustenance to al-Qaeda and their ilk. Recognizing and removing those grievances, where possible, has to be part of an effective al-Qaeda push-back strategy. It has not been thus far.

That does not require abandoning Israel. It does mean delivering on a decent and viable two-state solution that is already, for what it’s worth, official U.S. and Israeli policy. Implementing this perspective does not guarantee that al-Qaeda will disappear overnight. Much of the swamp of anger from which it draws support and recruits will be drained, however, and al-Qaeda-type groups will have to then appeal to a set of grievances that have far less resonance.

The DDNF must also stop viewing political Islamists as one undifferentiated sea of green hostility. This view is utterly self-defeating, artificially increasing the size of the enemy while unnecessarily limiting the pool of potential allies. It also displays a woeful ignorance of the internal debates and harsh fissures among Islamist groups. What has happened locally and of necessity in developing a more discerning approach to Islamists in Iraq and Afghanistan must percolate to the level of big-picture framing.

Finally, the DDNF’s directives must begin to build a new and inclusive regional security architecture. As a prerequisite the U.S. should both repair its image as an international leader that plays by the rules (no Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, or extraordinary renditions) and that embraces multilateralism. Ultimately, the region in general (and post-Iraq stability in particular) requires a security framework that makes stakeholders of all the major actors. That will take time, but as policies shift from “no talking to bad guys” to “tough problemsolving diplomacy,” so the language of “axes of evil” and “pariah states” should be buried.

Even adversaries have legitimate interests. Accept these, reject what is illegitimate, and build buy-in from the broadest array of regional actors.

In reality, of course, there is no government department known as the DDNF (at least not since Doug Feith retired). There is, though, an echo chamber, which can amplify the new president’s perspectives and facilitate a new approach to the Middle East.

How would this translate into specific areas of policy content and presentation? Here are a few ideas.

The new president should dust off one Bush-era relic and reconvene the members of the Iraq Study Group for a widely publicized final meeting. The theater of the occasion would broadcast that the new policies are solidly rooted in the findings of a grand, bipartisan group, whose recommendations were ignored by an excessively partisan predecessor. The ISG report recognized that “all key issues [in the Middle East] are inextricably linked.” It argued for unconditional engagement with Syria and Iran and pushed for a diplomatic surge. Despite a costly two-year delay, the time would arrive for the “New Diplomatic Offensive” envisaged by Baker, Hamilton, and Co. Even the name, New Diplomatic Offensive, might be worth recycling.

Some might see America’s Israeli relationship as the Achilles’ heel of the new strategy. It need not be. The new president would be well advised to explain early and often how the policy shift would protect and carry forward the U.S.-Israel special relationship. Indeed, it’s the policy of “more of the same” that threatens that relationship. For almost a decade the Israeli consensus has been to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. That now needs to happen, urgently, on reasonable terms and with attention to Israel’s real security concerns. Israel also has an interest in strengthening America’s regional standing and coalition-building capacity, something the U.S. cannot do until it addresses the Palestinian predicament. The challenges that America, Israel, and others face, from al-Qaeda’s successful attacks in Jordan and the Egyptian Sinai to its putative presence in Lebanon and Gaza to the threat of growing instability and weapons proliferation -- all this and more should no longer be overshadowed by an argument over a few kilometers of land in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. America should work closely with Israel in designing a new regional security architecture. Even if Benjamin Netanyahu is again Israel’s prime minister in January 2009, it is worth remembering that he, too, often with American encouragement, handed over land, shook the hand of Chairman Arafat, and secretly negotiated with Syria. Israel would be a beneficiary of the new U.S. policy even if some might be reluctant to accept it.

Turning to Iraq, the U.S should not isolate that nation’s challenges from others in the region. It should not be blaming Iraqis for their inadequacies, nor arming various sides for a potentially bloodier phase of the civil war. The new president needs to state clearly America’s commitment to end the military deployment that began in March 2003, and pledge not to maintain military bases there. This policy would focus the thinking of Iraqi factions on the political compromises necessary in a post-occupation Iraq. Second, the U.S. should make an “outside in” effort with all of Iraq’s neighbors to create the optimal conditions for externally assisted stabilization.

This regional rethink would come at a delicate time in the Iranian election calendar. Iran’s presidential ballot is scheduled for June 2009, and nothing should be done in the preceding months that might strengthen Ahmadinejad -- neither saber-rattling nor White House invitations. Better to sit this one out. The most elegant proposal would be to announce a six- to 12-month policy review on Iran -- avoiding heavyhanded (and probably counterproductive) election interference while gently hinting at future possibilities. After elections, and almost regardless of the results, the new administration should test the option of an unconditional and multi-issue political dialogue. The kind of grand bargain that was apparently offered by Iran and summarily rejected by the U.S. in 2003 (well documented by Flynt Leverett among others), should be re-examined. Israel’s former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, an advocate of hard negotiations with Iran, has argued that religious regimes can be the most flexible of creatures, as God is always with them whatever they decide. If a grand bargain or even ad-hoc understandings are unattainable, then Iran’s regional reach can be challenged more effectively by trying to bring actors like Syria and Hamas inside the tent. The peace process and Gulf policy should not be Irano-centric, thereby magnifying Iranian pretensions to hegemony. Containment and mutual deterrence, not pre-emptive military action, must be the fallback policy should all else fail.

Iranian cooperation would have immediate repercussions in the Lebanon-Syria arena. Bush’s policy exacerbated Lebanese internal divisions, eschewed any incentives for Syrian good behavior and discouraged the resumption of Israeli-Syrian talks. In the Israel-Lebanon-Syria triangle the U.S. was part of the problem, not part of the solution. Loyalty to the Cedar Revolution assumed a higher priority than prevention of a renewed Lebanese civil war. The new president should be guided by the principle of no return to Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Beyond that, America needs the good sense to allow flexibility on the Hariri Tribunal if there are important quid pro quo’s to be gained. Its strategic objectives should be to promote internal accommodation, not conflict within Lebanon, to renew Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and to resume its own high-level bilateral dialogue with Syria.

The hobby of regime change should also be abandoned on the Palestinian front. The Bush administration made a dizzying three attempts at shaping the Palestinian Authority leadership. The end result is a Palestinian house so divided that it complicates peace efforts, perhaps fatally, and weakens the political as opposed to militant tendency within Hamas. The opportunity presented by a Palestinian government of national unity, with Hamas endorsing both a ceasefire and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, needs to be resurrected in some fashion.

Recalibrating policy toward Hamas has become central to progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Contrary to popular misperception, Hamas and al-Qaeda are adversaries, not allies. Hamas is about ending the occupation and reforming Palestinian society; al-Qaeda, about opposing the West per se and spreading chaos in the Muslim world and beyond. One is reformist, the other revolutionary; one nationalist, the other post-nationalist; one grievance-based, the other fundamentalist. Hamas has signaled that it will accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. It can be worked with, albeit indirectly for political reasons. Under a new administration, U.S. policy toward Hamas should enter a period of deniable ambiguity, as third parties (principally Arab and European) explore a series of propositions with the Hamas leadership.

The Hamas question, though, is about more than the West Bank and Gaza. It touches on whether political Islamists, the Muslim Brothers among them, can be allies and even play a pivotal role in the struggle against al-Qaeda. These non-takfiri Islamists (takfiris, al-Qaeda among them, support an extreme interpretation of Islam, and offensive, not defensive, Jihad) are embroiled in their own bitter fight with the radicals. Democratic Islamists tend to be the big winners when free elections are held in the Arab world, and their very participation in such elections is considered kufran abomination to Islam -- by the takfiri jihadists. They are religiously conservative, sometimes oppressively so, but they are not at war with the West, and America’s unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with them over rules of the game for co-existing and rooting out al-Qaeda has been perhaps the most glaring and stubbornly shortsighted omission in U.S. post-September 11 policy.

These divisions within political Islam are an unexploited opportunity. Lumping all Islamists together is politically and intellectually lazy and dishonest, helping al-Qaeda to portray America as anti-Muslim. It also exacerbates American reliance on repressive regimes fearful of democratic elections that might displace them. The reality is that most Islamists are mainstream, non-takfiri. At the very least, the alternative of a dialogue with non-takfiri political Islam should be explored. Can, for instance, the Turkish model of an Islamic but pro-Western polity be reproduced in the Arab world, and if so, under what circumstances? Which is why a blue-ribbon commission on “Reducing al-Qaeda and Takfiri Influence in Islamic Societies” should be constituted to report to the new president by autumn 2009.

A triangle can be drawn on the map of the world that runs from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic Coast of Morocco to the Horn of Africa. I haven’t touched on all the problems in that triangle -- Pakistan and Afghanistan or energy policy, for instance. Nor does that triangle encompass all of the Muslim world. This triangle contains only about 6 percent of the planet’s population. The next president will have to focus on relations with China, protecting our environment, and tackling global human security, and rightly so. But this triangle, if irresponsibly managed, has a proven ability to suck America in and leave little oxygen for anything else. But that’s a fate the next president can avoid.

Copyright 2008, The American Prospect