Palestine

Jehan Sadat on Middle East Peace

Patrick Doherty — Tue, 31 Mar 2009 15:47:00 -0400

Today the New America Foundation is honored to be hosting former Egyptian First Lady, Jehan Sadat. Dr. Sadat, who spends half her year as a scholar in residence at the University of Maryland, will be discussing the ideas she outlines in her latest book, My Hope for Peace.

The Fate of Democracy in Palestine

Benjamin Katcher — Wed, 22 Oct 2008 19:40:00 -0400

This post was authored by Joshua Meah, a research intern for The American Strategy Program

Late into the night of Friday October 3, 2008, in an effort to settle a dispute over whether Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has the power to extend his tenure as President and move elections for the next president of the Palestinian Authority until 2010, there was a meeting of high-level Palestinian officials, including Hamas' Nasser Eddin al-Shaer, the previous deputy prime minister of the PA and President Abbas himself, in Ramallah.

At the core of the dispute is a contradiction between the Palestinian Basic Law and an election law that took effect when Abbas was elected. In short, the Palestinian Basic Law states that the term for the President of the Palestinian Authority is four years, but an election law stipulates that the Palestinian Legislative Council and the President are to be elected in 2010. January 2009 marks the fourth year of Abbas's tenure.

The current dispute is striking not because Abbas is trying to extend the reign of his political power (as many politicians do), but because the central question in Palestine is whether he has the legitimacy to do so.

In a strange way, this is the evolution of democracy; the struggle for constitutional legitimacy.

Leaders of Hamas have stated that should Abbas unilaterally extend his tenure, Hamas will no longer recognize him as President. One Hamas official stated that, "We will remove his pictures from all the public institutions. Until now our policy has been not to challenge Abbas' legitimacy as the elected leader of the Palestinian Authority... If he wants to seek another term in office, he should contest new elections. By announcing that he will stay in power for another year, Abbas is acting in violation of the Palestinian Basic Law."

Futher, Hamas stated that an interim president would be declared if Abbas does not step down. That would be Ahmed Bahr, an important Hamas leader and the current acting speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council. To this, an official of the Palestinian Authority remarked that "Bahr forgot that he's only the acting speaker of the Parliament and that the speaker is Abdel Aziz Dweik (currently in Israeli jail)."

This legal squabbling between Hamas and Fatah over constitutionality and political succession is meaningful, if only because it stands in stark contrast to the paramilitary takeover by Hamas of the Gaza strip and to the tactical use of violence by both parties to undermine each other...a trend that continues. On Saturday, October 4, 2008, less than one day after Hamas leaders met with Abbas, Fatah was forced to beef up its security team as information leaked that Hamas was considering a coup-style takeover of the West Bank. Subsequently, Hamas denied that such a move was ever in real consideration.

Keeping the feet of Hamas and Fatah to the democratic fire, however, is the role played by an unlikely organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As a warning to the parties in dispute, a leading member of Islamic Jihad declared that if reconciliation over this election dispute did not occur soon, then both parties should expect further violence to erupt.

Like it or not, with all of its thorns, this is democracy in action.

ASP In the News | July 16-18

Ian McAllister — Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:33:00 -0400

The Economist (07/17) quotes Peter Bergen on Al Qaeda's self destructive tendencies.
iStock Analyst (07/17) features Steve Clemons arguing against claims of success in Iraq.
The New York Observer (07/17) reviews Michael Cohen's new book, Live from the Campaign Trail.
The Moderate Voice (07/16) cites Daniel Levy on evolving aspects of the Israeli Palestinian divide.
The Newshour with Jim Lehrer (07/16) interviews Daniel Levy on Israel's controversial trade with Hamas.
Financial Times (07/16) quotes Steve Clemons on the Cheney's loss of influence in the Bush Administration.
Policy Innovations (07/14) features Flynt Leverett discussing the rise of China on global business and security.
Freezer Box (07/11) cites Jeffrey Lewis on the growing role for civil society in nuclear nonproliferation.

Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare

Ian McAllister — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 19:34:00 -0400

If you just read the wires coming out of the Holy Land, the Israeli-Palestinian situation is a confused mess. Israel is negotiating with Syria, Hamas, and the PLO; Olmert is one step ahead of an indictment, and more and more Israeli politicians are calling for a military strike on Iran.

What have been lost within the noise of the 24-hour news cycle are the larger strategic issues confronting the United States in our inconstant role as mediator: how do the various Palestinian factions come together as an acceptable, effective partner in negotiations? Are Israelis finally ready to come to terms with the land-for-peace equation? Can a new U.S. president focus enough energy on Israel-Palestine when Iraq and Iran loom so large?

America does not have unlimited time to get a deal. The developments of the past couple weeks-including the revelations of indirect talks between Syria and Israel, and the recent, albeit failing, cease-fire between Israel and Hamas-provide further evidence of America's diminished capacity to influence events in the region.

These questions, explored in Aaron Miller's new book, "The Much Too Promised Land," will be the point of departure for a lively conversation on Friday at the New America Foundation with three Middle East experts and former policy advisers representing American, Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the conflict.

Wasted Chances for Peace

Patrick Doherty — Fri, 13 Jun 2008 10:56:00 -0400

We all know there have been many missed opportunities for peace in the Middle East, but 21 over the past eight years? Michael Shtender-Auerbach made this useful compilation of all the efforts that went no where over the last two terms.

Bush's Bluffing Has Made Mideast Peace a Bad Bet
The Jewish Daily Forward
By Michael Shtender-Auerbach
June 12, 2008

From Taba to Tony, from the Rose Garden to Riyadh, from Geneva to Gaza - in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no American president has been presented with more opportunities for reaching a true and lasting peace than George W. Bush. But with just a half a year to go before he leaves the White House and little indication of a breakthrough, it is all but certain that Bush will leave behind a conflict more intractable than ever, not to mention a situation in Gaza that ranks as the world's third-largest humanitarian crisis after Somalia and Darfur.

This is more than just an exercise in historical finger pointing. When the 44th president of the United States is sworn in next January, he will inherit a legacy of failed chances at Middle East peacemaking. To borrow a phrase from Abba Eban, the president has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity - to be exact, 21 opportunities over the past eight years to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Twenty-one: That's blackjack, with no jackpot.

The next president, be it John McCain or Barack Obama, would do well to revisit those missed chances, for they offer an instructive lesson: American diplomacy in the Middle East needs to be about more than lofty rhetoric and half-baked initiatives - it needs to be about strategically pursuing the path of peace, supporting those that seek peace and following through on the necessary steps to achieve peace.

1.      Taba Summit, January 2001: As Bill Clinton left office and Bush assumed it, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation teams met in Taba, Egypt, to continue what was started in 2000 at Camp David. The summit dealt with final-status questions and were by far the most robust, complete and hopeful talks between Israelis and Palestinians since Oslo.

2.      Mitchell Report, April 2001: While the second intifada raged on, former Senator George Mitchell headed a fact-finding mission whose report outlined a set of confidence-building measures to end the intifada, stop settlement expansion and bring the parties back to the negotiating table.

3.      Tenet Plan, June 2001: CIA Director George Tenet, hoping to solidify the recommendations of the Mitchell Report, went to Jerusalem to detail a security plan to end the violence and resume negotiations.

4.      Arab Peace Initiative, March 2002: The initiative, also known as the Saudi Peace Initiative, was a watershed in peacemaking efforts. Based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Arab League unanimously agreed to normalize relations with Israel as the outcome of a negotiated two-state solution. It also included a reference to an agreed-upon solution to the question of Palestinian refugees, signaling that Israel's objections to a massive return of refugees were beginning to find acceptance in the Arab world.

5.      The Madrid Quartet, April 2002: A quartet of Middle East mediators was constituted with the purpose of multi-lateralizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It combined the political superpower of the United States with the financial backing of the European Union and the international legitimacy of the United Nations, as well as with the balancing influence, as seen through Arab eyes, of Russia.

6.      Rose Garden Speech, June 2002: Bush, to the surprise of many, became the first American president to openly state that a major American foreign policy objective would be to support and bring about a two-state solution and an end to Israeli occupation. A trailblazing speech, it signaled that some in the White House were beginning to understand the significance of the American role in the conflict.

7.      U.N. Security Council resolution 1397, June 2002: The resolution affirmed unanimous international support for the vision outlined in Bush's Rose Garden speech.

8.      Road Map for Peace, April 2003: Based on the parameters set out by Bush's Rose Garden speech, the Madrid Quartet developed a comprehensive plan, with the goal of delivering an independent Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with a secure Israel.

9.      U.N. Security Council resolution 1515, May 2003: The resolution affirmed unanimous international support for the Quartet's Road Map for a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

10. Geneva Initiative, December 2003: Drafted by former Israeli negotiators and their Palestinian counterparts, the Geneva Initiative maps out in comprehensive detail a blueprint for a permanent status solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with goals based on the parameters spelled out at Camp David, as well as on the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative. While not an official document, most credit it as the impetus for Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.

11. James Wolfenshohn appointed envoy, April 2004: The former World Bank president was appointed as the Quartet's special envoy for Israel's Gaza disengagement. An American Jew trusted by both Israel and Washington, Wolfensohn would resign his post in 2005 in deep disappointment at the way the Bush administration systematically undermined his efforts.

12. Death of Yasser Arafat, November 2004: While Arafat was revered by Palestinians as the founder of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Palestinian national movement, his death also entailed an enormous opportunity for change and for greater democratic governance for Palestinians.

13. Mahmoud Abbas elected president, January 2005: A non-violent pragmatist and long-time advocate of negotiations, after being elected he immediately called for an end to the intifada, a cessation of the armed struggle for independence and the resumption of peace negotiations with Israel.

14. Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, February 2005: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hosted Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan to re-commit the parties to the Road Map and formally bring an end to the second intifada.

15. Gaza disengagement, August 2005: The disengagement showed that Israel was capable of and willing to cease its settlement enterprise and withdraw from Palestinian territory. But instead of building momentum for a further withdrawal of settlers from the West Bank and reviving peace talks, the Bush administration expressed understanding for Israel's painful domestic struggle and rewarded Sharon with the promise that existing demographic realities in occupied territory would be taken into account in eventual final-status talks.

16. Agreement on Movement and Access, November 2005: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice negotiated an 11th-hour agreement to improve Palestinian living conditions by creating parameters for better movement and access for Palestinians. The main purpose was to re-open the Rafah border crossing from Gaza to Egypt, a fundamental precondition for a peace deal. The border remains closed.

17. Baker-Hamilton Commission, May 2006: James Baker and Lee Hamilton's commission, officially known as the Iraq Study Group, opened up the previously taboo "linkage" discussion by arguing that the "United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict."

18. Prisoners Document, June 2006: Palestinian prisoners held by Israel from groups including Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine drafted a "National Reconciliation Document." The signatories agreed to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, marking a potentially crucial opportunity to co-opt Islamist militants and create a broad Palestinian consensus in favor of negotiations and territorial compromise.

19. Mecca Agreement, March 2007: To address the emerging crisis between Hamas and Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia convened national unity talks in Mecca to hammer out a unity government. Instead of embracing the accord, the Bush administration reportedly engaged in a clandestine effort to arm Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan against Hamas, which reacted with a military takeover of Gaza that June.

20. Tony Blair appointed envoy, June 2007: The former British prime minister, with his high profile and stature, was tasked with improving Palestinian governance, economics, and institution-building. While Washington supported Blair's involvement, the State Department made clear his mandate did not include that of peacemaker.

21. ... and blackjack, November 2007: Bush convened a major summit in Annapolis, Md., and coaxed Israelis and Palestinians into a commitment to try to reach an agreement by the time he left office in January 2009. Six months later, the president has yet to deliver any real progress.

Michael Shtender-Auerbach, CEO of Social Risks LLC, is co-director of the New America Foundation's Law and Globalization Initiative.

ASP in the News | May 19-21

Ian McAllister — Thu, 22 May 2008 14:47:00 -0400

The Santiago Times (05/22) quotes Parag Khanna on America's declining global power.
International Press Service (05/21) cites Daniel Levy's analysis of the Middle East peace process.
Yahoo News (05/19) quotes Steve Clemons on McCain's strategy to discredit Obama.
The Washington Post (05/18) features Parag Khanna discussing The Post-American World, by Fareed Zakaria.
Arab American News (05/16) quotes Daniel Levy on the need for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories.

ASP In the News | May 12-14

Ian McAllister — Wed, 14 May 2008 16:33:00 -0400

The Associated Press (05/ 13) quotes Daniel Levy on the state of the Middle East peace process.
Foreign Policy in Focus (05/12) cites William Hartung on lessons learned in the Iraq War.
The New York Observer (05/12) mentions Parag Khanna in a discussion of the state of US hegemony.
World Politics Review (05/12) cites Flynt Leverett on China-US tensions.
US News (05/09) quotes Steve Clemons on Hillary Clinton's fading political future.

ASP in the News | April 23 – 28

Mon, 28 Apr 2008 17:08:00 -0400

Financial Express (4/27) speaks with Parag Khanna about the decline of US influence
The Boston Globe (4/27) quotes Flynt Leverett on the dangerous alliances oil producers and despots.
The Tory Conservative (4/27) features Afshin Molavi's book, Persian Pilgrimages.
MWC News (4/25) discusses prospects for a Palestinian state with Ghaith al-Omari.
The Jewish Week (4/23) asks Daniel Levy about the Presidential candidates' Middle East Policies.

A New Israel Lobby

Kailash Srinivasan — Fri, 18 Apr 2008 23:54:00 -0400

In debates surrounding U.S.-Israeli relations, the role of certain pro-Israel political action committees has been heavily contested. While for some they represent the true interests of both America and Israel, New America's Daniel Levy is skeptical and instead thinks their agenda leaves both countries worse off. In an April 16th Huffington Post article, he announced J Street, a new political action committee for Americans who think to America's best interests are served by a just, negotiated two-state solution and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Next President and the Middle East

Patrick Doherty — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 16:04:00 -0400

The greater Middle East contains only six percent of the world's population but can keep the United States distracted from the bigger strategic issues: making globalization, the rise of Asia, and the American economy stable and sustainable, for instance. Writing in the American Prospect, Daniel Levy lays out a regional to-do list for the next president of the United States.

By Daniel Levy, New America Foundation

The American Prospect | April 2008

Listen carefully when a new president is inaugurated next January for the sigh of relief coming from most of those Middle Easterners whom President Bush embraced as allies. Conversely, Bush’s rivals in the region are likely to tune in to the occasion in a disgruntled mood. For them the Bush years have been good for business. The menu of grievances on which they’ve fed has become a veritable feast. Opposition to American designs in the region -- deployed with different emphases and with different goals by al-Qaeda, Iran, Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah, to name but a few -- has been an easy sell and has won countless new adherents.

To be a friend of “Bush the Younger” in Arabia has not been such a comfortable disposition. Even the Israelis have begun to recognize the limited utility of a president, despite all his words of support, who is so vilified abroad and divisive at home that coalition-building and agenda-advancement are beyond him.

A new president can expect to be greeted by an initial spike in America’s standing in public opinion polls both globally and in the Middle East. This phenomenon will likely be magnified if a Democrat is in the White House and further embellished if that Democrat is Barack Obama. There will be a honeymoon period of openness, of a willingness to suspend judgment and to look again at America and what it stands for.

But the next administration will inherit a regional mess that will require more than some presidential goodwill and an image makeover. The president’s Middle East inbox will include Iraq, Iran, al-Qaeda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and much more. Set alongside this, even health-care reform may take on the appearance of low-hanging fruit.

The temptation will be to focus on improving the mechanics of making and implementing decisions and treating each problem separately, with various regional issues being compartmentalized. Some cosmetic changes might also be thrown in. One could envisage, for instance, the appointment of a special envoy to oversee an Iraq international support group and another for the Middle East peace process. That first appointment would be new; the latter has not existed for the past eight years, and its reintroduction would signal serious intent. A new American ambassador could be appointed to Damascus, symbolizing reengagement in dialogue with adversaries. The last ambassador, Margaret Scobey, was recalled from Syria on Feb. 15, 2005, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon.

Such moves should be welcomed and might even be helpful, but capacity and cosmetics are just the beginning. As Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt, concludes in a recent article, “better a policy without an envoy than an envoy without a policy.”

Policies will have to change. But so too will the framework of understanding from which those policies are derived. Take, as an example, the Israeli-Palestinian Annapolis peace process, launched in November 2007. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice managed to lead a change in policy within the administration and to renew efforts toward a permanent-status peace deal after a seven-year hiatus. She probably deserves credit for even getting this far, but the Annapolis process was straitjacketed from the start by its framing. Even when a breakthrough document on Israeli-Palestinian peace has become a priority, the kinds of policy initiatives that could lead to this goal were rejected at the outset for ideological reasons. Just before the Annapolis gathering, 66 former U.S. senior officials and experts, spearheaded by Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Lee Hamilton, sent a letter to the president and secretary of state welcoming the new effort and counseling that an “inclusive” process that would involve (even indirectly) and incentivize actors such as Syria and Hamas would be much more likely to succeed than one that excluded them. (In the interest of full disclosure, the New America Foundation -- my employer -- and I were involved in organizing and promoting this letter.) That counsel was not heeded. Syria was indeed invited but not engaged. The policy -- no peace effort -- was changed, but the framing -- Israel/Palestine is part of the war on terror, so one must isolate Islamists, Iran, and their ilk -- remained the same. The Annapolis exercise was thereby handicapped from the start.

Similarly on Iraq, Rice moved to engage with all the neighboring nations in February 2007, but within a mandate so narrow that it severely limited the regional push for a settlement in Iraq. At the micro-level, the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq (and Afghanistan) successfully demanded that they be authorized to work with a broad cross section of local actors, including those with problematic histories and Islamist credentials. Likewise, the increasing reliance of U.S. forces on local Sunni Awakening Councils was a new direction. However, none of this led to a reframing of the narrative at the meta-level. The U.S. view on whom to bring into the Iraqi political dialogue -- from both inside and outside the country -- remained prohibitively blinkered. As a result, political progress remains painfully elusive.

Iraq’s more troublesome neighbors, some U.S. allies, some not (Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the former camp, Iran and Syria in the latter), cannot wave a wand and magically end the Mesopotamia mess. They can be instrumental, though, in helping to stabilize the situation. That requires incentives, constant prodding, and a comprehensive rethink from the U.S.

Accordingly, a new administration Middle Eastern “to do” list that amounts just to isolating the issues, managing the processes efficiently, keeping ambitions modest, and throwing everything at Iraq, would be wholly inadequate to the task ahead. The first priority should be to connect the dots of regional issues to reflect the realities and interdependencies on the ground. One cannot solve anything in the Middle East (including Iraq) without looking afresh and trying to solve just about everything.

Change must begin at the Department of Deep Narrative Framing (DDNF). Absent a new narrative for the Middle East, a Democratic administration will inexorably, even unintentionally, slide into the grip of the liberal hawks. The equation will look something like this: unreconstructed narrative + good liberal interventionist inclinations = a more competent (perhaps) but equally misguided (and perhaps therefore even more dangerous) version of neoconservatism, albeit wrapped in a more palatable sales pitch. If the Democrats seize the reins of government next January, they should not forget to grab control of the DDNF. Barack Obama’s claim that he would not only “end the war in Iraq” but also “end the mind-set that got us into that war” indicates that one candidate at least is eyeing up the DDNF for change. What might a reshuffle at the department produce?

Start by redrawing that map of issue interconnectivity, retiring the current war on terror paradigm, and rethinking the appeal to hearts and minds. Cranking up the use of soft power and aid programs and reducing the military footprint is not enough. At least three epiphanies are required of the next president to go forward: First, recognize that certain widely held grievances in the Middle East -- the Palestinians’ most particularly -- are both legitimate and solvable. Second, understand that political Islamists are not all the same, are not all al-Qaeda, and that building a policy based on these differences is crucial to resolving the region’s problems. And third, comprehend that regional stability demands inclusivity and a commitment to multilateralism.

The global war on terror and the democratization narratives that the Bush administration has propagated are irredeemably discredited in the Middle East. They are most commonly seen as a war on Islam and a hypocritical and inconsistent application of a “freedom” agenda that protects autocratic friends and punishes democratic opponents.

A recent sporting episode demonstrates the global resonance of a grievance largely ignored in the U.S. The Africa Nations Cup, a continent-wide biannual soccer tournament (a mini World Cup) was hosted in Ghana this January and February. Egypt emerged victorious, guaranteeing massive interest not only throughout Africa but also across the Middle East on the Arabic satellite channels. The matches coincided with the Gaza siege and Rafah border breakout, and on scoring the tournament’s winning goal, Egypt’s star striker, Mohamed Aboutrika, lifted his national team jersey to reveal a T-shirt bearing the inscription, in English and Arabic, “Sympathize with Gaza.” America’s media was totally oblivious to these goings-on, but for vast areas of our world this simple gesture of solidarity echoed louder than a dozen presidential speeches about why the Palestinians must first recognize their Israeli occupiers and reject the Hamas party that they voted for in free elections.

Travel almost anywhere in the Arab or Muslim world and you will hear the same refrain, including from America’s most ardent friends in the business community and civil society: “Why do you allow or even encourage such things to happen to the Palestinian people? How can we stand with you on this?”

Most Middle Easterners who have no sympathy with al-Qaeda and extremism do nonetheless identify with the Palestinians’ grievances. The sense of U.S. indifference to such grievances and unwillingness to address them is a source of great sustenance to al-Qaeda and their ilk. Recognizing and removing those grievances, where possible, has to be part of an effective al-Qaeda push-back strategy. It has not been thus far.

That does not require abandoning Israel. It does mean delivering on a decent and viable two-state solution that is already, for what it’s worth, official U.S. and Israeli policy. Implementing this perspective does not guarantee that al-Qaeda will disappear overnight. Much of the swamp of anger from which it draws support and recruits will be drained, however, and al-Qaeda-type groups will have to then appeal to a set of grievances that have far less resonance.

The DDNF must also stop viewing political Islamists as one undifferentiated sea of green hostility. This view is utterly self-defeating, artificially increasing the size of the enemy while unnecessarily limiting the pool of potential allies. It also displays a woeful ignorance of the internal debates and harsh fissures among Islamist groups. What has happened locally and of necessity in developing a more discerning approach to Islamists in Iraq and Afghanistan must percolate to the level of big-picture framing.

Finally, the DDNF’s directives must begin to build a new and inclusive regional security architecture. As a prerequisite the U.S. should both repair its image as an international leader that plays by the rules (no Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, or extraordinary renditions) and that embraces multilateralism. Ultimately, the region in general (and post-Iraq stability in particular) requires a security framework that makes stakeholders of all the major actors. That will take time, but as policies shift from “no talking to bad guys” to “tough problemsolving diplomacy,” so the language of “axes of evil” and “pariah states” should be buried.

Even adversaries have legitimate interests. Accept these, reject what is illegitimate, and build buy-in from the broadest array of regional actors.

In reality, of course, there is no government department known as the DDNF (at least not since Doug Feith retired). There is, though, an echo chamber, which can amplify the new president’s perspectives and facilitate a new approach to the Middle East.

How would this translate into specific areas of policy content and presentation? Here are a few ideas.

The new president should dust off one Bush-era relic and reconvene the members of the Iraq Study Group for a widely publicized final meeting. The theater of the occasion would broadcast that the new policies are solidly rooted in the findings of a grand, bipartisan group, whose recommendations were ignored by an excessively partisan predecessor. The ISG report recognized that “all key issues [in the Middle East] are inextricably linked.” It argued for unconditional engagement with Syria and Iran and pushed for a diplomatic surge. Despite a costly two-year delay, the time would arrive for the “New Diplomatic Offensive” envisaged by Baker, Hamilton, and Co. Even the name, New Diplomatic Offensive, might be worth recycling.

Some might see America’s Israeli relationship as the Achilles’ heel of the new strategy. It need not be. The new president would be well advised to explain early and often how the policy shift would protect and carry forward the U.S.-Israel special relationship. Indeed, it’s the policy of “more of the same” that threatens that relationship. For almost a decade the Israeli consensus has been to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. That now needs to happen, urgently, on reasonable terms and with attention to Israel’s real security concerns. Israel also has an interest in strengthening America’s regional standing and coalition-building capacity, something the U.S. cannot do until it addresses the Palestinian predicament. The challenges that America, Israel, and others face, from al-Qaeda’s successful attacks in Jordan and the Egyptian Sinai to its putative presence in Lebanon and Gaza to the threat of growing instability and weapons proliferation -- all this and more should no longer be overshadowed by an argument over a few kilometers of land in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. America should work closely with Israel in designing a new regional security architecture. Even if Benjamin Netanyahu is again Israel’s prime minister in January 2009, it is worth remembering that he, too, often with American encouragement, handed over land, shook the hand of Chairman Arafat, and secretly negotiated with Syria. Israel would be a beneficiary of the new U.S. policy even if some might be reluctant to accept it.

Turning to Iraq, the U.S should not isolate that nation’s challenges from others in the region. It should not be blaming Iraqis for their inadequacies, nor arming various sides for a potentially bloodier phase of the civil war. The new president needs to state clearly America’s commitment to end the military deployment that began in March 2003, and pledge not to maintain military bases there. This policy would focus the thinking of Iraqi factions on the political compromises necessary in a post-occupation Iraq. Second, the U.S. should make an “outside in” effort with all of Iraq’s neighbors to create the optimal conditions for externally assisted stabilization.

This regional rethink would come at a delicate time in the Iranian election calendar. Iran’s presidential ballot is scheduled for June 2009, and nothing should be done in the preceding months that might strengthen Ahmadinejad -- neither saber-rattling nor White House invitations. Better to sit this one out. The most elegant proposal would be to announce a six- to 12-month policy review on Iran -- avoiding heavyhanded (and probably counterproductive) election interference while gently hinting at future possibilities. After elections, and almost regardless of the results, the new administration should test the option of an unconditional and multi-issue political dialogue. The kind of grand bargain that was apparently offered by Iran and summarily rejected by the U.S. in 2003 (well documented by Flynt Leverett among others), should be re-examined. Israel’s former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, an advocate of hard negotiations with Iran, has argued that religious regimes can be the most flexible of creatures, as God is always with them whatever they decide. If a grand bargain or even ad-hoc understandings are unattainable, then Iran’s regional reach can be challenged more effectively by trying to bring actors like Syria and Hamas inside the tent. The peace process and Gulf policy should not be Irano-centric, thereby magnifying Iranian pretensions to hegemony. Containment and mutual deterrence, not pre-emptive military action, must be the fallback policy should all else fail.

Iranian cooperation would have immediate repercussions in the Lebanon-Syria arena. Bush’s policy exacerbated Lebanese internal divisions, eschewed any incentives for Syrian good behavior and discouraged the resumption of Israeli-Syrian talks. In the Israel-Lebanon-Syria triangle the U.S. was part of the problem, not part of the solution. Loyalty to the Cedar Revolution assumed a higher priority than prevention of a renewed Lebanese civil war. The new president should be guided by the principle of no return to Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Beyond that, America needs the good sense to allow flexibility on the Hariri Tribunal if there are important quid pro quo’s to be gained. Its strategic objectives should be to promote internal accommodation, not conflict within Lebanon, to renew Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and to resume its own high-level bilateral dialogue with Syria.

The hobby of regime change should also be abandoned on the Palestinian front. The Bush administration made a dizzying three attempts at shaping the Palestinian Authority leadership. The end result is a Palestinian house so divided that it complicates peace efforts, perhaps fatally, and weakens the political as opposed to militant tendency within Hamas. The opportunity presented by a Palestinian government of national unity, with Hamas endorsing both a ceasefire and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, needs to be resurrected in some fashion.

Recalibrating policy toward Hamas has become central to progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Contrary to popular misperception, Hamas and al-Qaeda are adversaries, not allies. Hamas is about ending the occupation and reforming Palestinian society; al-Qaeda, about opposing the West per se and spreading chaos in the Muslim world and beyond. One is reformist, the other revolutionary; one nationalist, the other post-nationalist; one grievance-based, the other fundamentalist. Hamas has signaled that it will accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. It can be worked with, albeit indirectly for political reasons. Under a new administration, U.S. policy toward Hamas should enter a period of deniable ambiguity, as third parties (principally Arab and European) explore a series of propositions with the Hamas leadership.

The Hamas question, though, is about more than the West Bank and Gaza. It touches on whether political Islamists, the Muslim Brothers among them, can be allies and even play a pivotal role in the struggle against al-Qaeda. These non-takfiri Islamists (takfiris, al-Qaeda among them, support an extreme interpretation of Islam, and offensive, not defensive, Jihad) are embroiled in their own bitter fight with the radicals. Democratic Islamists tend to be the big winners when free elections are held in the Arab world, and their very participation in such elections is considered kufran abomination to Islam -- by the takfiri jihadists. They are religiously conservative, sometimes oppressively so, but they are not at war with the West, and America’s unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with them over rules of the game for co-existing and rooting out al-Qaeda has been perhaps the most glaring and stubbornly shortsighted omission in U.S. post-September 11 policy.

These divisions within political Islam are an unexploited opportunity. Lumping all Islamists together is politically and intellectually lazy and dishonest, helping al-Qaeda to portray America as anti-Muslim. It also exacerbates American reliance on repressive regimes fearful of democratic elections that might displace them. The reality is that most Islamists are mainstream, non-takfiri. At the very least, the alternative of a dialogue with non-takfiri political Islam should be explored. Can, for instance, the Turkish model of an Islamic but pro-Western polity be reproduced in the Arab world, and if so, under what circumstances? Which is why a blue-ribbon commission on “Reducing al-Qaeda and Takfiri Influence in Islamic Societies” should be constituted to report to the new president by autumn 2009.

A triangle can be drawn on the map of the world that runs from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic Coast of Morocco to the Horn of Africa. I haven’t touched on all the problems in that triangle -- Pakistan and Afghanistan or energy policy, for instance. Nor does that triangle encompass all of the Muslim world. This triangle contains only about 6 percent of the planet’s population. The next president will have to focus on relations with China, protecting our environment, and tackling global human security, and rightly so. But this triangle, if irresponsibly managed, has a proven ability to suck America in and leave little oxygen for anything else. But that’s a fate the next president can avoid.

Copyright 2008, The American Prospect